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INTERNATIONAL HARMONIZATION OF
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS: A HOLY GRAIL
THAT EXCEEDS EVEN THE GRASP OF
INDIANA JONES
A COMMENT ON JEFFREY
JASON H.P. KRAVITT*
Mr. Jeffrey’s article, International Harmonization of Accounting
Standards and the Question of Off-Balance Sheet Treatment, provides
an insightful discussion of different accounting approaches to the
question of when a transaction, particularly a securitization, results in
off-balance sheet treatment of assets and liabilities.1  Mr. Jeffrey notes
that this issue has proved extremely challenging to accounting stan-
dards setters, and argues that while securities regulators and markets
are keen to harmonize accounting standards, the different ap-
proaches—represented by the U.S. accounting standards (U.S.
GAAP), U.K. accounting standards (U.K. GAAP), and International
Accounting Standards (IAS)—are not easily harmonized.
Under U.S. GAAP, Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB) statement 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Fi-
nancial Assets and Extinguishing of Liabilities2 (FAS 140), provides
that a securitization may be accounted for in one of four ways—most
commonly, as a partial sale, where the transferor retains servicing
and/or interests in the assets and the FAS 140 sale criteria are met.
Mr. Jeffrey notes that this approach results in the cash funding and
related assets and liabilities being taken off the balance sheet, while
the retained interests remain on the balance sheet (albeit in an new
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1. Peter Jeffrey, International Harmonization of Accounting Standards, and the Question
of Off-Balance Sheet Treatment, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 341 (2002).
2. FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS NO. 140:
ACCT. FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FIN. ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF
LIABILITIES (2000) [hereinafter FAS 140].
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form such as mortgage servicing rights).3  To qualify for sale treat-
ment under FAS 140, one must demonstrate, first, that there has been
a true sale of assets to a special purpose entity (SPE) and, second,
that on the bankruptcy of the seller, its creditors cannot make a claim
on the assets of the SPE (i.e., the SPE is bankruptcy remote from the
transferor).4  Further, FAS 140 clearly states that a Qualifying SPE’s
(QSPE) assets and liabilities do not need to be consolidated in the fi-
nancial statements of the transferor.  To be a QSPE, the entity must,
in most circumstances, be on “automatic pilot;” in other words, most
of the commercial decisions of the entity are predetermined.5
Mr. Jeffrey notes that it is unclear what accounting principles are
used to justify not consolidating these types of SPEs, and that other
accounting standard setters find the defining of QSPEs a difficult
concept to accept.  He argues that the practice seems more driven by
the need to allow off-balance sheet securitizations than good ac-
counting practice.6  I disagree.  It would be misleading to consolidate
the QSPEs if the transferor is in fact not exposed to its liabilities and
does not have access to its assets in the traditional manner an owner
can use its assets.  Showing the transferor’s investment in the QSPE’s
assets is a much fairer and less misleading representation of what is
going on.
In his analysis of the trend towards harmonization of accounting
standards, Mr. Jeffrey also notes that, at least in the short term, it is
likely that IAS and U.S. GAAP will operate as the two main ac-
counting regimes globally.7  However, he argues that the harmoniza-
tion of IAS and U.S. GAAP is problematic for a number of reasons.8
One approach towards harmonization would be the repeal of the
Standards Interpretation Committee Pronouncement Number 12
(SIC 12), which provides that an SPE should be consolidated if an en-
3. Jeffrey, supra note 1, at 343.
4. FAS 140, supra note 2, ¶ 35.
5. Id.  Note that while there are precise restrictions on sales of assets, there are no explicit
restrictions on issuance, or reissuance, of liabilities to finance those assets.  Further, while FAS
125’s definition of a QSPE was written such that it could have no powers other than four pre-
scribed powers, see FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCT. STANDARDS
NO. 125: ACCT. FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FIN. ASSETS AND EXTINGUISHMENTS OF
LIABILITIES ¶ 26 (1996), paragraph 35 of FAS 140 is written solely to prohibit certain actions; it
is silent on what is permitted.  Presumably, a strong argument in interpreting paragraph 35 is the
traditional common law principle of interpretation that what is not prohibited is permitted.
6. Jeffrey, supra note 1, at 344.
7. Id. at 349.
8. Id. at 349–50.
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terprise has in substance control of the SPE,9 and the amendment of
IAS to recognize that SPEs used in securitizations do not need to be
consolidated, thus “effectively aligning IAS with US GAAP.”10  This,
however, he regards as unlikely in view of the fallout from Enron, and
recommends, as a short term measure, rewriting SIC 12 to provide for
circumstances where the distribution of risks and rewards may or may
not require consolidation.11  I do not agree that Enron will lead FASB
to adopt a draconian alternative to the present rule.  Rather, I expect
them to adopt a rule which more or less recognizes the economic sub-
stance of most securitizations, for example, continuing to require con-
solidation of QSPEs by corporate parents.  The substance of the use
of SPEs in most securitizations is to reallocate risks and rewards.
Consolidation is usually more misleading (than lack of consolidation)
because it is opaque to this reallocation.  Indeed, in the next para-
graph of Mr. Jeffrey’s article, discussed below, we seem to agree sub-
stantially on this point.
In that next paragraph, Mr. Jeffrey goes on to note that “[a]n ar-
gument may be made for changing IAS, as its current approach fails
to recognize that a significant transaction occurs when the risks and
rewards profile of companies and securities is changed by such a
transaction.”12  It seems intuitive that after a securitization there must
be some impact on the securitizer’s balance sheet—in fact, a securiti-
zation is much more than a funding transaction because it also trans-
fers asset-risk to the funder.  In this context, Mr. Jeffrey’s suggestion
that a securitization under IAS be accounted for by recognizing that
the asset-backed bonds can only be repaid from the proceeds of the
assets is an excellent one.13  This would mean, in effect, that the only
asset remaining for the account of the company is the net asset (i.e.,
securitized asset less funding) and it is this asset that should be recog-
nized on the balance sheet.  This approach recognizes that the level of
assets which the company has at risk has been reduced.  Thus, the
funding and associated assets are taken off the balance sheet, whether
or not a sale has been recognized technically.  As Mr. Jeffrey points
out, this approach does not bring forward profits as U.S. GAAP does,
and is also more conservative insofar as it does not assume that in-
9. Jeffrey notes that, “Most commentators agree that an off-balance sheet securitization is
not possible under IAS because of SIC 12.”  Id. at 348.
10. Id. at 350.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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come has been recognized from the transfer of the securitized assets
on account of future cash flows.14
I agree with Mr. Jeffrey that the above approach would be pref-
erable to the approach now in effect of the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB).15  If the IASB chooses not to adopt either
U.S. GAAP or the above discussed more conservative approach, then
at the very least the IASB should adopt the U.K. GAAP approach.
That approach recognizes in a similar fashion the changes in risk and
reward profile brought about by a securitization.16
14. Id.
15. INT’L ACCT. STANDARD 39: FIN. INSTRUMENTS: RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT
(2000), reprinted in INT’L ACCT. STANDARDS COMM., INT’L ACCT. STANDARDS 2001, at 1153.
16. Jeffrey, supra note 1, at 344–45.
